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3 . The Science of Man 
Perha s the chief achievement of the Enlightenment was the 
crea,t,i.on _of the~, SQ Q.;i6J.. S (( ienC~§ e. . ~ca _ ~On 0 ese ~ - Lff - "1 ... ~iii'!Of. iliiOMiiisiAii5.~"""""" 1 lllll:t'fl"!" - :!Ill 
.§ciences to the problems of h'1man existence.. . The selections 
which follow offer a first-hand glimpse of the type of work that 
Enlightenment thinkers accomplished in the fields of psychology, 
~onomics, politicaL science, and ethics. The selections are 
but fragments of tEor ougQ. systematic analyses of the foregoing 
subjects. However, our primar y inter est here is to understand 
some of the important assumptions and conclusions rather than 
to acquire a detailed knowledge of each of the sciences. The 
ideas presented may seem oversimplified and naive to the mind 
of a twentieth century social scientist, but that is simply the 
result of a perspective based on two centuries of further re-
search and experimentation . 
* Reprinted f r om Introduction to Contemporary Civilization in the 
West ... , 2nd ed . (New York : COiumbia University Press, 1954},~ 
~-1041, 1043-1047, 1048-1050. Used with permi~sion. 
*P~~~~~v ~=~~ ~£~~ !z~ /dAJ4. ._ IJV;:j ~·~/2. _ /_, ·~ -:;z;~(,:;;Jj~~ . ,~~ ~· .. -r· P ~.kf"' ........ 
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Introduction 
l , the :understanding that sets man above 
tpe rest e beings, an g1ves him all the advan-
tage and dominion wn!ch fie has over them; it is c ertainly 
a subject, even for its nobleness, worth our labour to 
inquire into . The u nderst a nding, like the eye, whilst it 
makes us see and perceive all other things, takes no notice 
of itself; and it requires art and pains to set it at a 
distance and make it its own object. But whatever be the 
difficulties that lie in the way of this inquiry; whatever 
it be that keeps u s so mu ch in the dark to ourselves; sure 
I am that all t h e li ght we can let in upon our minds, all 
the acquaintance we can make with our own understandings, 
will not only be very pleasant, but bring us great advan-
tage, in directing our thou ghts in the search of other 
things. 
2 . This, ther efor e, being my purpose -- to inquire 
into the original, cer tainty, and extent of human know-
ledge, together with the g r ounds and degrees of beTief, 
op1nion, and assent; -- I shall not at present meddle with 
the physical consideration o f the mind; or trouble myself 
' to examine wherein its essence consists; or by what mo-
tions of our spirits or alterations of our bodies we come 
to have any sensation by our organs, or any ideas in our 
understandings; and whether those ideas do in their forma-
tion, any or all of them, depend on matter or not. These 
are speculations which , however curious and entertaining, 
I shall decline, as lying out of my way in the desi g n I 
am now upon . I t shall suffice to my present purpose, to 
consider the discer ning faculties of a man..., as they are 
effiP!oyed about tfie objects which they have to do with. 
And I shall imagine 1 have not wholly misemployed myself 
in the thoughts I shall have on this occasion, if, in this 
histo:.r ic.al, plain me t hod, I can give any account of the 
ways whereby our understandings come to attain those no-
tions of things we have ; and can set down any measures of 
the certainty of our knowledge; or t .he grounds of those 
persuasions which a.re to be found amongst men, so various, 
different, and wholly contradictory; and yet asserted 
somewhere or other with such assurance and confidence, 
that he that shall take a view of the opinions of mankind, 
observe their opposition, and at the same time consider 
the fondness and devotion wherewith they are embraced, the 
resolution and eagerness wherewith they are maintained, 
may perhaps have reason to suspect, that gither the~s 
no such thing as truth at all, !2F that mankind ha~h no 
~uff~~~~t means~o at t a1n nowl~d e o 1 . 
3. It is there ore worth while to searc out the 
bounds between opinion and knowledge; and examine by what 
measures, in things whereof we have no certain knowledge, 
we ought to regulate our assent and moderate our persua-
sion . In o r der whereu nto I shall pursue this following 
method : --
First , I shall inquire into the original of those ideas, 
notions, or whatever else you please to call them, which 
f 
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a man observes, and is conscious to himself he has in his 
mind ; and the ways wher eby the u nders t anding comes to be 
furnished with them . 
Secondly, I shall endeavour to show what knowledge the 
understanding hath by those ideas; and the certainty, evi-
dence, and extent o f it . 
Thirdly, I shall make some inquiry into the nature and 
grounds of faith or opinion ~ whereby I mean that assent 
whjch we give to any proposition as true, of whose truth 
yet we have no certain knowledge . And here we shall have 
occasion to examine the r easons and degrees of assent .... 
Book I 
Chapter I 
po Innate Speculative Principles 
1. It is an establ i s he d op1n1on amongst some men, that 
there are in the understanding certain innate principles; 
some primary notions, , .. , characters 9 as it were stamped 
upon the mind of man ; which the sou l receives in its very 
first being, and brings i nto t he world with it. It would 
be sufficient to convince u nprejudiced readers of the ~;~~~~ 
falseness of this supposition , if I should only show (as~~ 
I hope I shall in the follo. w. ing~pa.rts of th1.·s niscourse) . ~~~ 
pow men, barely by the use of their natural fac~lti~s 1 may~~~-
at@.il1 to _ . . knowled e :Jill..~ • .!l~ye ... ~ ... tp.~ help _of~-
,ilnY innate impressions; nd rna arrive at ce_r:t · :i.:t.h-
~Pt a such prigina.l notions gr _ rinciples. For I imagine 
any one will e~s1 y grant that it woul e impertinent to 
suppose the ideas of colours innate in a creature to whom 
God hath given s ight, and a power to receive them by the 
eyes from external objects : and no less unreasonable would 
it be to attribute sever al truths to the impressions of 
nature , and innate characters, when we may observe in our-
selves faculties fit to attain as easy and certain know-
ledge of them as if they were originally imprinted on the 
mind .. , , ... , , , 
Book Il 
Chapter I 
pi Ideas in GeneraL and Their Ori _i 
1. Every man being conscious to himself that he 
thinks; and that which his mind is applied about whilst 
thinking being the ideas that are there, it is past doubt 
t ,ha}; .men.Jl,a.vo i:R tbe;;t r,=minds ~Sl~~l:iil.l... ideas, -- such as are 
those expressed by the words whiteness, hardness, sweetness, 
thinking, motion, man, elephant, army, drunkenness, and 
others : it is in the first place then to be inquired, How 
he comes by them? 
- I know Tils a :rece :Lv.e.d ..doctrj ne, thai me.n halz.e _ ti '[e 
ideas, and oricrinal c h _ters s ~amped upo th~~ 
in their -very f krst being/ This opinion I have at large 
examine~ alre a dy; ana, ! - s u ppose what I have said in the 
foregoing Book will be much more easily admitted, when I 
have shown whence the understanding may get all the ideas 
it has ; and by what ways and degrees they may come into 
the mind; -- for which I shall appeal to every one's own 
observation and exper ience . 
?1!~~--4~/_;~~~-
( 
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2 . Let us then suppose the mind to be,, as we say,~~ 
white paper , vo1 d o f a ll characters, without any ideas:-- ~~ 
Sow comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that ~ ~ 
vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has _~~~ 
painted on it with an almost endless variety? ~hence hA~~ ­
;lL.a.l .L t.he.. m@~s ....r.eas__.o.n.....and.-kno:w-ledge?--..;Lo . 1§ I J... .~,0//~~ 
a swer in one wo d from EXPERIEN E. In that all our ~~~ 
knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derive~ ~-
itself . Our observation employed either, about external ~ 
sensible objects, or about the internal operations of ou~u~~ 
minds perceived and reflected on by ourselves, is that ~'-
which supplies ou r understandings with all the material~~~~ 
of thinking . These two are the fountains of knowledge, , ­
from whence all the ideas we have, or can natu rally have,~~- . 
do spring . ~~ 
3. Fi r st, ou r Senses, conver sant abou t particular 
sensible objects, do convey into the mind several distinct 
perceptions of things, according to those various ways 
wherein those objects do affect them . And thus we come by 
those ideas we have of yellow , white, heat , cold, soft, 
hard, bitter, sweet, and all those whicn-we carr sensible 
quali t1es; which when I say the ,aenses copvey . i ntamth~ 
mind J I mean, they from external objects convey into the 
fu ind what produces there those perceptions . This great 
source of most of the ideas we have, depending wholly upon 
our senses, and derived by them to the understanding, I 
call SENSATION. 
4 . Secondly, the other fountain from which experience 
furnisheth the understanding with ideas is, -- the per-
ception of the operations of our own mind within us, as 
it is employed about the ideas it has got; -- which oper-
ations, when the soul comes to reflect on and consider, 
do furnish the understanding with another set of ideas~ 
which could not be had from things without . And such are 
perception, thinking , doubting, believing, r easoning, 
knowing, willing, and all the different actings of our own 
minds; -- which we being conscious of, and observing in 
ourselves, do f r om these receive into our understandings 
as - distinct ideas as we do from bodies .affecting our 
senses . This sou rce of ideas every man has wholly in 
himself; and though it be not sense, as having nothing 
to do with external objects, yet it is very like it, and 
might properly enough be called internal sense . But as I 
call the other Sensation, so I call this Reflection, t~ 
i~eas it a•fords ~ein~ e~~~ q pl y %~ the mind gets by re~ 
fleeting on its olin oi2eriiiJ:ms wit i n itself.. By reflec-
t i on then, in the following part of this discourse, I 
would be understood to mean, that notice which the mind 
takes of its own operations, and the manner of them, by 
reason whereof there come to be ideas of these operations 
in the understanding. These two, I say, viz . external 
material things, as the objects of SENSATION , and the 
operations of our own minds within, as the objects of 
REFLECTION , are to me the only ori g inals from whence all 
our ideas take their beginnings . The term operations 
~~~~~~ ~7k~~~~~m~-
( 
( 
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here I use in a large sense, as comprehending not barely 
the actions of the mind about its ideas, but some sort of 
passions arising sometimes from them, such as is the satis-
faction or uneasiness arising from any thought. 
5. The understanding seems to me not to have the least 
glimmering of ideas which it doth not receive from one 
of these two. External objects furnish the mind with the 
ideas of sensi e qua 1ties, which are all those different 
perceptions they produce in us; and the mind ~urnishes the 
understanding with ideas of its own operat1on~ 5 
These, when we have taken a full survey of them, and 
eir several modes, (combinations, and relations ~ ) we 
all find to contain all our whole stock of ideas; and-
at we have nothing in our minds which did not come in 
one of these two ways. Let any one examine his own 
thoughts; and thoroughly search into his understanding; 
and then let him tell me, whether all the original ideas 
he has there, are any other than of the objects of his 
senses, or of the operations of his mind, considered as 
objects of his reflection. And how great a mass of know-
ledge soever he imagines to be lodged there, he will, upon 
taking a strict view, see that he has not any idea in his 
mind but what one of these two have imprinted; -- though 
perhaps, with infinite variety compounded and enlarged by 
the understanding , as we shall see hereafter .... 
Chapter II 
Of Simple Ideas 
1. The better to understand the nature, manner, and 
extent of our knowledge, one thing is carefully to be ob-
served concerning the ideas we have; and that is, that 
some of them . are simple and some complex. 
Though the qualities that affect our senses are, in the 
things themselvesr so united and blended, that there is no 
separation, no distance between them; yet it is plain, the 
ideas they produce in the mind enter by the senses simple 
and unmixed. For, though the sight and touch often take 
in from the same object, at the same time, different ideas; 
-- as a man sees at once motion and colour; the hand feels 
softness and warmth in the same piece of w~x: yet the 
simple ideas thus united in the same subject, are as per-
fectly distinct as those that come in by different senses. 
The coldness and hardness which a man feels in a piece of 
ice being as distinct ideas in the mind as the smell and 
whiteness of a lily; or as the taste of sugar, and smell 
of a rose. And there is nothing can be plainer to a man 
than the clear and distinct perception he has of those 
simple ideas; which, peing each in itself uncompounded, 
contains in it nothing but one uniform appearance, or con-
ception in the mind, and is not distinguishable intodif-
ferent iaea~ ----
2. These simple !deas, the materials of all our know-
+edge, are suggested and furnished to the mind ·only by 
these two ways above mentioned, viz. sensation and reflec-
tion. When the understanding is once stored with these 
simple ideas, it has the power to repeat, compare, 
( 
( 
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and unite them, even to an almost infinite variety, and so 
can make at pleasure new complex ideas. But it is not in 
the power of the most exalted wit, or enlarged understand-
ing, by any quickness or variety of thought, to invent or 
frame one new simple idea in the mind, ~ot taken in by the 
ways before mentioned: nor can any force of the understand-
ing destroy those that are there. The dominion of man, in 
this little world of his own understanding being muchwhat 
the same as it is in the great world of visible things; 
wherein his power, however managed by art and skill, reaches 
no farther than to compound and divide the materials that 
are made to his hand; but can do nothing towards the making 
of the least particle of new matter, or destroying one atom 
of what is already in being .... 
Chapter XII 
Of Complex Ideas 
1 . We have hitherto considered those ideas, in the 
reception whereof the mind is only passive, which are those 
simple ones received from sensation and reflection before 
mentioned, whereof the mind cannot make one to itself, nor 
have any idea which does not wholly consist of them. But 
as the mind is wholly passive in the reception of all its 
simple ideas, so it exerts several acts of its own, whereby 
out of its simple ideas, as the materials and foundations 
of the rest, the others are framed. The acts of the mind, 
erein it exerts its power over its _~ 
chiefly t ese three~ _c.om: · · _ Y. s 
· to one com ound _ e · and thus all complex ideas are made. 
(2) The second is Eringing two ide~ , whether s1mple or 
complex, ! o gether, and sett ing them by one anotherJ ~as 
to take a view of ffiem at once, without uniting them into 
one; by which way it gets all its ideas of relations. 
(3) The third is separating them from al~other ideas t at 
accompany them in their real exf stence: this is called 
a s racfl on : an thus all its general ideas are made. 
This shows man's power, and its ways of operation, to be 
much the same in the material and intellectual world. For 
the materials in both being such as he has no power over, 
either to make or destroy, all that man can do is either 
to unite ...!hem toflether, or i:O:sef :th~m by Q:pe another. :or 
wholly s~~rate them. I shall here begin with the first 
Ol -fnese in the consideration of complex ideas, and come 
to the other two in their due places. As simple ideas 
are observed to exist in several combinations united to-
gether, so the mind has a power to consider several of 
them united together as one idea; and that not only as 
they are united in external objects, but as itself has 
joined them together. Ideas thus made up of several 
simple ones put together, I call complex; -- such as are 
beauty, gratitude, a man, an army, the universe; which, 
though complicated of various simple ideas, or complex 
ideas made up of simple ones, yet are, when the mind 
pleases, considered each by itself, as one entire thing, 
and signified by one name. 
2 . In this faculty of repeating and joining together 
( 
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its ideas, the mind has great power in varying and multi-
plying the objects of its thoughts, infinitely beyond what 
sensation or reflection furnished it with : but all this 
still confined to those simple ideas which it received from 
those two sources, and which are the ultimate materials of 
all its compositions . For simple ideas are all from things 
themselves, and of these the mind can have no more, nor 
other than what are suggested to i~ It can have no other 
ideas of sensible qualities than what come from without by 
the senses; nor any ideas of other kind of operations of a 
thinking substance, than what it finds in itself. But when 
it has once got these simple ideas, it is not confined 
barely to observation, and what offers itself from without; 
it can, by its own power, put together those ideas it has, 
and make new complex ones, which it never received so 
united . 
3 . Complex ideas , however, compounded and decompounded, 
thou gh the1 r number be infinite, and the varie~y endless, 
wherewith they fill and entertain the thoughts of men; yet 
I think they may be all reduced under these three heads:--
1. MODES . 
2 . ' SUBSTANCES . 
3 . RELATIONS. 
4 . First, Modes I call such complex ideas which, how-
ever compounded, con~ain not in them the supposition of 
subsisting by themselves, but ~re considered as depend-
~nces on, or affections of §ubstances; -- such as are the 
ideas signified by the words triangle, gr:JttLtuge, murder, 
&c . And if in this I use the w ord mode in somewhat a dif-
ferent sense f r om its ordinary signification, I beg pardon; 
it being unavoidable in discourses, di;ffering from the 
ordinar y r eceived notions, either to make new words, or to 
use old words in somewhat a new signification; the later 
whereof, in our present case, is perhaps the more toler-
able of the two . 
5 . Of these modes, there are two sorts which deserve 
distinct cous i der afian : --
- ~rst, there are some which are only variations, or_ 
different co inations t e same s1m e 1. without 
the mixture of any other; -- as a dozen, or score; whic 
are nothing but t e 1 eas of so many distinct units added 
together, and these I call simple modes as being contained 
within the bounds of one simple idea . 
~condly, there are atbers compounded of simple idea~ 
of several k1nds ut to ther o make n com lex one; --
v . g. beaut consistin of a cert i com osition of colour 
and fi re ca _ ~~theft wh~c 
eing the conce ~ of the possession of an thing, 
w1 o th ropr1e or, conta1ns is 
visible, a combin on of severa 1 eas of several kinds: 
an ese I call mixed modes . 
6 . Secondly, the ideas of substances · · a~e ·such:· coihbi·;,;: 
nations of sim a a e taken to re resent dis t1nct 
particular things subsisting by themse ves· in w ich the 
supposed o~~fuse 1 ea o su stance, such as it is, is 
( 
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always the firs t and chief. 
the simple idea of a certain dull 
i w be,_i,cie,a_o.L J ead.~ and 
ideas of a certain sort of fi re 
tion, _tllaugh: d reasoni,n, .),Q.j,.n O._.§,.U stance _m~ke ~e 
··· ordinary idea of. a man . Now of substances also, there a re fWo sorts of ideas : -- one of sing le substances, as they 
exist separately, as of a man or a sheep; the other of 
several of those put together, as an army of men, or flock 
of sheep -- which collective ideas of several substances 
thus put together are as much each of them one single idea 
as that of a man or an unit. 
7 . Thirdly, tne last sort of complex ideas is that we 
call relat1o~*' which consists in the consideration and 
comQar1n aru 'dea with another. 
---- Of these several kinds we shall treat in their order. 
8 . I f we t race the progress of our minds, and with 
attent i on observe how it repeats, adds together, and 
uni t es its s i mp le ideas received from sensation or reflec-
tion, it will lead us further than at first perhaps we 
- should have imagined. And, I believe, we shall find , if 
we warily observe the orig inals of our notions, that even 
the most abs t ruse ideas, how remote soever they may seem 
from sense, or from any operations of our own minds, are 
yet only such as the understanding frames to itself, by 
repeating and joining together ideas that it had either 
from objects of sense, or from its own operations about 
them : so that those even large and abstract ideas are d .e-
rived from sensation or reflection, being no other than 
what the mind, by the ordinary use of its own faculties, 
employed about ideas received from objects of sense, or 
from the op erations it observes in itself about them, may, 
and does, attain unto . 
This I shall endeavour to show in the ideas we have of 
space, time, and infinity, and some few others that seem 
the most remote, from those originals. * 
The e£qnomic x peory first developed during the Enli ghten-
ment and expanded in the nineteenth century is known _a~ clas-
ical ec omic liber alism . The French name for the same theory 
was physiocracy . Both terms convey its spirit : {reedom for 
=-=-- G=ne=g economic laws believed to be as eternal 
i utable as the laws of h sics. The function o 
as a science he d to be the discovery of the laws 
plain and the actions of men 1n fie1r econom1c 
----------~--- -
It remained for 
of moral philosophy , 
* 
·~ 
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Introduction and Plan of the Work 
The annual labour of every nation is the fund which 
originally supplies it with all the necessaries and con-
veniences of life which it annually consumes, and which 
consist always either in the immediate produce of that 
labour, or in what is purchased with that produce from 
other nations. 
Accordin therefore as this e or what r-
chased w1t 1t bears a greater or smaller proportion to 
the number of those w 0 a re 
wrrr--be better or worse su lied ith a the necessaries 
an conven1ences or which it has occasion . 
But this proportion must in every nation be regulated 
by two different circumstances : first, by the skill, 
dexterity, and judgment with which its labour is_ g,e.ner-
ally applied; and, second! by the proportion between 
e num er ojl_those w o are e~ploye 1n use u 
an a of those who are not so emplo ed. Whatever be 
tlie soil, c 1mate, o~ extent o t err 1tory of any par-
ticular nation, the abundance or scantiness of its annual 
supply must; in that particular situation, depend upon 
those two circumstances. 
The abundance or scantiness o is su to 
depen more u on the former of those two cir stances ~~~ 
an u Q the la e~. Among t e S~JLe natidns of hunters r?~?~ 
ana fishers, every individual who-rs-able to ork _is . e 
or ~s ~1~e ~ U~~£ul a OUT, and endeavours to pro-
vide, as well as he can, the necessaries and conveniences 
of life, for himself, or such of his family or tribe as 
are either too old, or too young, or too infirm to go a 
hunting and fishing. Such nations, however, are s ·s-
erably poor, that frqm mere wan , t e y are freguentl re-
Bllced, OF:at least think themsel ves reduced, to th~-
~~- [1)/;_~~~io~ · 
~ ~~~~ 
( 
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necessity s metimes of direct and s s 
1?~3- a nsi.QJJ ing tbei.r .infants, the ir.......Ql d .peo~Jnd t~....@ e 
afflicted with lin e in diseases, to perish with hunger 
;or - o_j:)e devour d b~ wj ,- d heaat.s.. Ail1ong(!i vi ised ana 
-~ing nations, on the contrary, though a great number 
of people do not labour at all, many of whom consume the 
produce of ten times, frequently of a hundred times more 
labour than the greater part of those who work; yet the 
p roduce of the whole labour of the society is so great, 
that all are often abundantly supplied, and a workman, 
even of the lowest and poorest order, if he is frugal and 
industrious, may enjoy a greater share of the necessaries 
and conveniences of life than it is possible for any 
savage to acquire. 
Book I 
Chapter II 
Of the Principle which Gives 
Occasion to the Division of Labour 
':this di_yi _sio labour, from which so many advantages 
are deri ved, is not orig inal! the effe~t pf an human 
wisdom, which foresees and intends that general opulence 
ow 1ch it gives occasion. It is the necess y, though 
very slow and gradual _ conse uence. 9!. a s,~n propensily_ 
in human nature which has in view ensiv '1-
---- - · pt ,[ tne propensi y to truck, bar .. t e };,. and e,.ft._c.han.g.e .p ne 
tn11'ig for ano eher. <::::::::== 
~ Wnether t his propensity be one of those original prin-
ciples in human nature, of which no further account can be 
given; or whether, as seems more probable, it be the nec-
essary consequence of the faculties of reason and speech, 
it belongs not to our present subject to inquire. It is 
common to all men, and to be found in no other race of 
animals, which seem to know neither this nor any other 
species of contracts . Two greyhounds, in running down 
the same hare, b'ave sometimes the appearance of acting in 
some sort of concert . Each turns her towards his compan-
ion, or endeavours to intercept her when his companion 
turns her towards himself. This, however, is not the ef-
fect of any contract, but of the accidental concurrence 
of the'ir passions in the same object at that particular 
time . Nobody ever saw a dog make a fair and deliberate 
exchange of one bone for another with another dog. Nobody 
ever saw one animal by its gestures and natural cries sig-
nify to another, This is mine, that yours; I am wi1lling to 
give this for that. When an animal wants to obtain some-
thing either of a man or of another animal, it has no other 
means of persuasion but to gain the favour of those whose 
service it requires. A puppy fawns upon its dam, and a 
spaniel endeavours by a thousand attractions to engage the 
attention of its master who is at dinner, when it wants to 
( 
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be fed by him . Man sometimes uses the same arts with his 
brethren, and when he has no other means of engaging them 
to act according to his inclinations, endeavours by every 
servile and fawning attention ~to obtain their good-will. 
He has not time, however, .to do this upon every occasion. 
In ·tvrn.,ze society he stand all ·u me, . · i n eed- o. :the 
co..:: o - - a an as~n.st a..n...c.e ea~ m.ultJ.tud~ , w.bile is 
whole life is scarce suffi._ci .t~,.t :tQ g.a · n tbe friendshiP. o.f 
a few _ersons . . n almost every other race of animals each 
n ividual, when it is grown up to maturity, is entirely 
independent, and in its natural state has occasion for the 
assistance of no other living creatur-e . But man has al~ · -· 
most constant occasion for the help of hiS: brethren. and 
it i s in vain for him to ex ect it from their benevolence 
only . He will e more likel to r ·  if he can interest 
Tne! r - ave in his f , and•show them that it is 
eir own advantage to do for him what he requires of 
them . Whoever offers to another a bargain of any kind, 
pr oposes to do this . Give me that which I want, and you 
shall have t his which you want, is the meaning of every 
such offer; and it is in this manner that we obtain from 
one anot her the far greater part of those good offices 
which we stand in need of. It is not from the benevolence 
of the butcher, the brewer or the baker · hat we ex ect 
o~r dinner, u rom eir regard to their own interest. 
We address ourselves, not to their humanity but to their 
self-love, and never talk to them of our own necessities 
bu t of their advantages . Nobody but a beggar chooses to 
depend chiefly upon the benevolence of his fellow-citizens. 
Even a beggar does not depend upon it entirely . The char-
ity of well-disposed people, indeed, supplies him with the 
wnole fund of his subsistence. But though this principle 
ultimately provides him wit~ all the necessaries of life 
which he has occasion for, it neither does nor can provide 
him with them as he has occasion for them . The greater ·; 
par t of his occasional wants are supplied in the same man-
ner as those of other people, by treaty, by barter, and 
by pur chase . With the money which one man gives him he 
pu rchases food . The old clothes which another bestows 
upon him he exchanges for other old clothes which -suit 
him better, or for lodging, or for food, or for money, 
with which he can buy either food, clothes, or lodging, 
as he has occasion . 
~s it is by treaty, by barter. and by purchase, 
obt a1n f rom one other the ~ater . ar of those 
1s same trucki·ng _dis osition ori inally gives 
occasion to 1visio f r. In a tri e o -hunters 
~ ep e r s a particular person makes bows and arrows, 
for example, with more readiness and dexterity than any 
other . He frequently exchanges them for cattle or for 
venison with his companions; and he finds at last that he 
can in this manner get more cattle and venison than if he 
himself went to the field to catch them. From a regard , - ~~ 
Uld~~~A:e/J-L-i;rt£~ ~~~ ~~­~~~)124.4~k~4z~ ~a-:-cf1/~ L/~(c. e_ 
-9)w-~~-
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to his own interest, therefore, the making of bows and 
arrows grows to be his chief business, and he becomes a 
sort of armourer. Another excels in making the frames 
and covers of their little huts or moveable houses. He 
is accustomed to be of use in this way to his neighbours, 
who reward him in the same manner with cattle and with 
venison, till at last he finds it in his interest to ded-
icate himself entirely to this employment, and to become 
a sort of house-carpenter. In the same manner a third 
becomes a smith or a brazier, a fourth a tanner or dresser 
of hides or skins, the principal part of the clothing of 
savages. And thus the ~~tai nty o_f being . abJ&:to _exchau,e;e//- _/ --~ 
all that surplus art of the reduce __ is ~n iah~ur,~~
1c 1s r an a ove his own consumption. for such  z;(p~ 
parts of the produce of other men's labour as he may have~~~­
occasion for, encourages ellecy....Jilan t o appl y himself to A -,..- - / , 
2articular occupatio~ , and to cultivate and bring to per- ~~~ 
fec t ion whate~ta!ent or genius he may possess for t~~-~~ 
particular species of business. ~w~~-. / 
The difference of natural talents in differ.e n t men l -s'(-- ___ ./~ 
in reality, much less than we are aware of; and the v ~y ~
differ nt genius which appears to distin~ish of dif-~~~ 
feren:Lpr.o:f-e.s_sions.., when ~Ji,...._up,__ a.tuz~.i~t-y; · oJ; u 011dy-~~ m~n_y occasiqns s .o_ .muc_h :the..--caus as.....;t..h! e,ffect of the k/--~~ 
aivision of labou~. The difference between the most dis · ~~ 
s1mi"I ara.c.t.~s, between a philosopher and -a common~ n~iii'Pt-..., 
street porter, for example, seems o arise not so ~~u~·gcEh~~~~~~~~ 
. rom nature as from habit c om and ed i en ~  , 
they came into the world, and for the first six or eight ·· · / 
years of their existence, they were very much alike, and 
neither their parents nor playfellows could perceive any 
remarkable difference. About that age, or soon after, they 
come to be employed in very different occupations. The 
difference of talents comes then to be taken notice of, 
and widens by degrees, till at last the vanity of the 
philosopher is willing to acknowledge scarce any resem-
blance. But without the disposition to truck, barter, and 
exchange, every man must have procured to himself every 
necessary and conveniency of life which he wanted. All 
must have had the same duties to perform, and the same 
work to do, and there could have been no such difference 
of employment as could alone give occasion to any great 
difference of talents. 
As it is this disposition which forms that difference 
of talents, so remarkable among men of different profes-
sions, so it is this same disposition which renders that 
difference useful. Many tribes of animals, acknowledged 
to be all of the same species, derive from nature a much 
more remarkable distinction of genius, than what, ante-
cedent to custom and education, appears to take place 
among men. By nature a philosopher is not in genius and 
disposition half so different from a street porter, as a 
mastiff is from a greyhound, or a greyhound from a spaniel, 
or this last from a shepherd's dog. Those different 
~~~~~~~vr~~­vkr~~¥~ ~~cy~. 
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tribes of animals, however, though all of the same species, 
are of scarce any use to one another . The strength of the 
mastiff is not, .in the least, supported either by the 
swiftness of the greyhoUnd, or by the sagacity of the 
spaniel, or by the docility of the shepherd 1 s dog . The 
effects of those different geniuses and talents, for want 
of the power o r disposition to barter and exchange, can-
not be brought into a common stock, and do not in the 
least contribute to the better accommodation and conven-
iency of the spec~es . Each animal is still obliged to 
support and defend itself, separ ately and independently, 
and derives no sort of advantage from that variety of 
talents with which nature has distinguished its fellows . 
Among men, on the contrary, the most dissimilar geniuses 
are of use to one another; the different produces of their 
respective talents, by the general disposition to truck, 
barter , and exchange, being b r ought , as it were, into a 
common stock, where every man may purchase whatever part 
of the p r odu ce of other men i s talents he has occasion for. 
Book IV 
Chapter II 
st on the Im ortat ion 
f r om Foreign Countries of 
Goods ·. s.-Ca orne 
. . . The -·general indu stry of the society never can exceed 
what the capital of the society can employ . As the number 
of workmen that can be kept in employment by any partic-
ular person must bear a certain proportion to his capital, 
so the number of those that can be continu ally employed by 
all the members of a great society, must bear a certain 
p r opor tion to the whole capital of that society, and never 
c an exceed that proportion . ~o regulation of comm_erce can 
increase th u antit · dus 1n an socie be o 
w a its ca ital c ~ It can only divert a part 
of it into a direction into which it might not otherwise 
have gone; and it is by no means certain that this arti-
ficial direction is likely to be more advantageous to the 
society than that into which it would have gone of its own 
accor d . ' 
Every individu al is continually exerting himself to 
_find out the most advantageous employement for whatever capital 
he can demand . It is hi$ own advantage , indeed, and not 
that of th w ich y 
of his own 
can 
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consum tion to the carr i trade . In the home trade his 
capital is never so long out of his sjght as it frequently 
-is in the for eign trade of consumption . He can know bet-
ter the charact er and situation of the persons whom he 
trusts, and, if he should happen to be deceived, he knows 
better the laws of the country from which he must seek 
redress . In the car rying trade , the capital of the mer-
chants is, as it were, divided between two foreign coun-
tries, and no part of it is ever necessa rily brought home, 
or placed under his own immediate view and command . .. . 
Secondly, every individual who employes his capital in 
the s u pport of domestic industry, necessarily endeavours 
so to direct that industry, that its produce may be of 
the greates t possible value . 
The p r odu ce of industry is what it adds to the subject 
or materials upon which it is employed . In proportion as 
the value of t h is produce is great o r small, so will like-
wise be t he p r ofits of the employer . But it is only for 
the sake of p r ofit that any man employs a capital in the 
s u pport o f i ndu str y; and he will always, therefore, en-
d~avour to employ it in the support of that industry of 
which the p r oduce is likely to be of the greatest value, 
or to exchang e for the greatest quantity either of money 
or of other goods . 
But the annual revenue of every society is always 
precisely equal to the exchangeable value of the whole an-
nual produce of its industry, or~ather is precisely the 
same thing with that exchangeable value . As every indi-
vidual, therefor e, endeavours as much as he c~n both to 
employ his capital in the support of domestic industry, 
and so to di r ect that industry that its produce may be of 
the greatest value, every individual necessarily labours 
to r ender the annual revenue of the society as great as 
he can . He generally, indeed, neither intends to promote 
the pu blic interest, nor knows how " much he is promoting 
it . p r e f err in the y,pp._ar...t,...Q,f-..dem.eS<t«i a.t . .-.-.._ 
forei · n 1ndu str he intends onl his own securit; and 
by 1recting that industry in such a manner as its pro-
duce may be of the greatest value, he intends only his 
own gain , and he is in this, as in many other cases, led 
by an invisible hand to promote an end which was no part 
of his intention . Nor is it always the worse for the so-
ciety that it was no part of it . By pursuing his own 
interest he frequently promotes that of the society more 
effectually than when he really intends to promote it. 
I have never known much good done by those who affected 
to trade for the public good . It is an affectation, in-
deed, not very common among merchants, and very few words 
need be employed in dissuading them from it . 
What is the species of domestic industry which his ~­
capi tal can employ, and of which the produce is likely to 
be of the greatest value, every individual, · · evident ,/-/ 1 ~ 
can, i g his local situation, _j u d ge much better than any c:zr~-~ ~~ 
Stalesman or lawgiver can do for him . The statesman, wh~ ­
s ou attempt o direct priva e people in what manner 
1~d~~Le~~~~~/ 
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they ought to employ their capitals, would not only load 
himself with a most unnecessary attent ion, but assume an 
au t hority which could safely be trusted, not only to no 
sing le person, but to no council or senate whatever, and 
which would nowhere be so dangerous as in the hands of a 
man who had folly and presumption enough to fancy himself 
fit to exercise it . 
To g ive the mon 
of domestic industry, in 
ture, 1 ~ 1n some measure to djrect ~r i vate 
manner the ou_ to em l _o · 
~lmos t all case b - e-lass"""""~:.Boo..a.....w~.Y;,,h.. 
lation . If the produce of domest i c can be brought there 
as clieap as that of f oreig n industry, the regulation is 
evidently useless . If it cannot, it must generally be 
hurtful . It is the maxim of every prudent master of a 
family , never to attempt to make at home what it will 
cost him mor e to make than to buy . The tailor does not 
attempt to make his own shoes, but buys them of the shoe-
make r . The shoemaker does not attemp t to make his own 
clothes, but employs a tailor. The farmer attempts to 
make neither the one nor the other, but employs those 
different artificers . All of them f i nd it for their in-
terest to employ their whole industry in a way in which 
they have some advantage over their neighbours, and to 
purchase with a part of its produce, or, what is the same 
thing, wi t h the price of a part of it, whatever else they 
have occasion for . 
What is prudence in 
ily, can scarce be folly 
~~~_...U..:::W!IIl!"=""'..;..w.-w.~~~~s~omw.ei.-if!~d~y~a;~:;nl!Jrot-~a,.i!- ~-e . e general in-
dustry of the country, being always in proportion to the 
capital which employs it, will not thereby be diminished, 
no more than that of · the above-mentioned artificers, but 
only left to find out the way in which it can be employed 
with the greatest advantage. It is certainly not employed 
to the greatest advantage, when it is t hus directed towards 
an object which it can buy cheaper than it can make. The 
value of its annual produce is certainly more or less di-
minished, when it is thus turned away from producing com-
modities evidently of more value tharr the commodity which 
it is directed to produce . According to the supposition, 
that commodity could be purchased from foreign countries 
cheaper than it can be made at home . It could, therefore, 
have been pur chased with a part only of the commodities, 
or, what is the same thing, with a par t only of the price 
of the commodities, which the industry employed by an 
equal capital would have produced at home, had it been 
left to follow its natural course . The industry of the 
country, ther efor e, is thus turned away from a more to a 
less advantageous employment, and the exchangeable value 
of its annual produce, instead of being increased, 
( 
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according to the intention o f the lawgiver , must neces-
sar ily be diminished by ever y s u ch r e gulation " 
By means of such r egu lations, indeed, a part icular 
manufacture may sometimes be acqu i red sooner than it 
c ould have been o therwise, a nd after a certain time may 
be made at home as cheap o r c heaper than in the foreign 
countr y , B-u t thou gh the industry o f the s ociety may be 
thus carried with advantage into a particular channel 
sooner than it cou ld have been o t her wise, i t will by no 
means foll ow that t he s um t otal , eithe r of its industry 
or of its r evenue s can ever be augmented by a ny such 
reg·ulation , The indastr y o f the society can augment only 
in p r oportion a s its capital augments, and its capital 
can augment only in p r opor tion to what c an be gradually 
saved ou t of i ts revenu e . But the immediate effect of 
every s uch r e gu lation is to d iminish its revenu e, and 
what d imin ishe s its r evenu e is certainly not very likely 
to au gme n t i t s capita l f aster than it W0\1 ld have aug-
mented of i t s own accor d j had both capital a nd industry 
been l eft t o find out thei r natural employments .; , . . 
Ther e seem, howeve r , to be two cases which it will 
gene ral ly be adva ntageou s t o la 
omes J.c J.n us r 
1 lar sor t of industry is 
e ence o f the coun · ry , The de ence o 
r eat Britain, for example, depen s very much u pon the 
number of its sailor s and shipping . The Act of Naviga-
ti o n 1 therefore ~ ver y p r oper ly endeavour~ to give {he · 
~ailo~s and the shi i · " 
the r ade o eir own c ou ntr y, in some cases by absolute 
.Pr'OhJ. b J. t J. ons 5 and in others by heavy bur dens upon the 
shippin g of f or eig n c ountr ies . , , . 
The ~econd case , in which it will gener ally be advan-
a e01us to - ow rno f ore :i n f o r the encour-
agement of dome sti c industr ·, is w en s ome tax J.S J.m-
p osedat - hpme. npon t he . oroJiu,pe of tg'!t latter . n this 
case j .it seems r e a Rap a ble that an e qu al tax should be im-
posed u . .h i ke . u ce o f t he fo r mer. This would 
o t give the monopoly o f t he home mark~t t o domestic 
1 -r;H"11!J Stcy , no r turn t owa r ds a particular empl oyment a 
gr eater shar e o f the stoc k and labour o f the c ountry than 
what wou ld natu r a lly go t o it . I t wou ld only hinder any 
p art o f what wou ld naturally go to it from being turned 
away by the t ax int o a l ess natura l direction, and would 
l e ave the c ompetition between for eign and domesti c in-
du stry, after the tax ~ as ne arly as possible upon the 
same f ooting as 'befor e it . In Great Britain, when any 
s u ch tax is laid u pon the produ ce of domestic industry, 
it i s u s u al a t the same time ~ i n o r der t o stop the clam-
or ou s c omplai n t s of ou r mer chants a n d manufacturers, that 
they will be u nd e r s old a t home , t o lay a much heavier 
duty u pon the import a tion of all f oreign goods of the 
same kind . * 
* Adam Smith, An Inqu i r y into t he Natur e and Causes of the Wealth 
of Nat i o s (Oxford ~ At tne-clarendon Pr ess , 1869) , I: T=2, 14-18; 
TI, 25-26 , 28-30, 35-36 , 38 , ' --.A•~ _,,;_ //~~n.d~ } ~ . . ~~u.LU/~ ~~ r~~r? - ~ j Y'' ~ ~ ..- ,{)tfkl~~~-~~~ ~~~~~ ,Y/7/ cS ~~ 4.. ~~~~c/JL_J/1 ' 
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£~li~~e~~ sc~c~ in t he eighteenth century displayed four 
main t endenAie§ . (ilrs!) there was the notion of a _scientific ~~ 
and enligh tened despo 1~, which was popu lar in muCh of Europe ~~ 
trntil the French Revo l ution . The idea of an absolute ru who ~ 
sincer e! pel ieve ,_in-~ the~ir.d.ell l s.....,Q the En lgpteniR.ent and w_Eo ~
~uld effici~~~ rational and just government ap-
pealed to men who wer e conf r onted wi t h illiterate populations ~ ~ 
on the one hand a n d with ou tmoded, chaotic laws and institutions4~~ 
on the other . Seco n t here was the theory qf cgnsti t utigyijlism > 
qased on n f tmr;; aJ.da;.1 ghts, a tter ned after the En lish and Dut h 
ac hievemen s , an popular in En g an and Ame r ica . hi r d, there 
was the concept of fkmocre;t y based...o..n n atlllral r j gl;jt,r;, w ich was 
_9eveloped in France by Rousseau and Ln-Amer i c a by Thomas Jeffer-
- son , a nd later by the Jackson ians . Fmu t , ther e was the d.e 
velo ment ' lit r· ' sm which was an e thical me thod gf 
and social l ems - .her than a 
Our s e l ections illu str ate only two o f these tendencies : 
.gnligh:tened ~spot ism ,and demo.c:x::~mr hasect a D na t.11,n~ a J ri~~. 
These rep r ese nted the main a venu es o f pol itical r eform chosen 
by the e ighteenth century on t he Continent . The first selec-
tion , An Essay on For ms of Gove r nment, a n d on the Du ties of 
SovereTgns ~ was-wr itten i n 1777 by ~derTci:t~Great. King of 
_grussia. ( 17 40-1786). I t is a statement o f the advantages of _ 
e n lightened despotism by a man who practi ced the theor y in his 
own cou n t r y . 
We a r e astonished at imagini ng the human r ace so long 
existing in a brutal state y a nd withou t fo r ming itself 
i n to soc i e ties . Reasons a r e - accor dingly s u gge sted, such 
as mi ght i nd c e p eople like these to u nite in bodies . _]Jl 
mu s t h a ve been t he vio ce and pilla ge whi c h exi d, 
among neighbour i ng hOrdes, that cou l a ve fi r st inspir ed 
s uch s a va ge fami lies with t~wish of unit ing, that they 
might secure thei r , p oss e ssion§J by mu t u al de fence . Hence 
laws took b i r th, whi ch tau ght those societies to prefer 
the gener al t o individu al g ood . Fr om that time, no per-
son durs t seize on t he effec ts of ano ther, be cause of the 
drea d o f chas t i sement . The life , the wife, and the wealth 
of a neighbour were sacred; and, if the whole society were 
attac k ed, it was the du of t he whol e to a s s emble for its 
defence . The r and t ruth , -- " That we shou l d do u nto 
others a s t hey s otUld o u nto u s" -- be c ame the principle 
o f laws, a nd o f the s oc ial compact . He nce or iginated the 
_to_ u r c ountr hi e was r egarde e a 0f 
a 
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allow of, and to elect, a superior; because this is the 
true o r i g in of sovereig n power . The magistrate, thus 
appointed, was the first servant of the state. When 
rising states had any thing to fear from their nei ghbours , 
the magistrate armed the people, and flew to the defence 
of the citizens . . . . 
We have remarked that men granted pre-eminence to 
one of their equals, in expectation that he should do them 
certain services . These services consisted in the main-
t~nc: ~;= ::~\J:~ a.w s...; a s ... trict execution of justice_; a~ 
e~pl~~ hole powers to revent an corru t1on 
o--r-ulann.e¥s; and efend1ng e s t ate a gainst its enemies. 
It is the duty of this mag1stra e o pay attention o 
agricultu re ; i t should be his care that p r ovisions for 
the nation shou ld be in abundance, and that commerce and 
industr y shou ld be encouraged . He is a perpetual senti-
nel , who must watch the acts and the conduct of the ene-
mies of the stat e . His foresi ght and prudence should 
form timely all i ances, which should be made with those 
who mi ght most conduce to the interes t of the association. 
By this short abstract, the variou s branches of know-
ledge, which each article in particular requires, will be 
per ceived . To this must be added a profound study of the 
local situation of the country, which it is the magis-
trate ' s du ty to govern, and a perfect knowledge of the 
genius of the nation; for the sove · sins through 
ignoranc~ is as culpable as e who sins t hrough malice: 
e first is e gu1 o 1 leness, the latter of a 
vicious heart; but the evil that resul t s to society is 
the same . 
r Pri nces and monarchs, therefore, are not invested 
with s u re a t r it hat the rna unit riot 
in debaucherY- and volu tuous es They are not raised by 
t e1r e ow citizens in order that their pride may pom-
pously display i t self, and ' contemptuously insult simplic-
ity of manners, pover ty and wr etchedness. Government is 
not int r usted t o them t hat they may be surrounded by a 
crowd of useless peop le , whose idleness engenders every 
vice . 
The ill administration of monar chical government 
orig inates in variou s cau ses, he sour ce of hich is in 
the ch f the sovereign . Thus a prince addicted to 
women s u ffers himself to be governed by his mistresses, 
and his favourites, who abuse the ascendancy they have 
over his mind, commit injustice , protect the most vicious, 
sell places, and are guilty of other similar acts of in-
famy . If the prince , through debility, should abandon 
the helm of the state to mercenary hands, I mean to min-
isters, in that case, each having different views, no one 
p r oceeds on general plans : the new minister fritters 
away what he finds already established , however excellent 
that may be, to acquire the character of novelty, and 
execute his own schemes, generally to the detriment of 
the pu blic good. His successors do the like ; they destroy 
and overtu rn with equal want of understanding , that they 
( \ 
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may be supp osed t o possess or i g inali t y . Hence that suc-
cession o f change and v a ri a t ion wh i ch allows no p r oject 
t ime t o t ake r oo t ; hence confusi~n , disor der, and every 
vice o f a bad admini st r a t ion. Prevaricators have a ready 
excuse ; they shelter their turp i tude u nder these perpetual 
changes . 
Men attach t hemselves to that wh i ch appertains to them, 
and t h e s t a t e does not apper tain t o these mini sters , for 
which r eason t hey have not its real good at heart; business 
is c a relessly execu ted, and with a kind of stoic indifference; 
and hence r esu l t s the decay of justice, and the ill admin-
istration o f t he f inanc es and t he mi l itar y . From a monarchy, 
it was t he ove r nment de ener ates into a true ar~stocr c , 
w ~ch mi_n .s.t.er,.s......aa . g n _r con ~ a,ccO--rdi ... ng 
to their own f anci s . There is no longe r any com rehensive 
~; each purs u e his own plans, an e centra int, the J1p/4
4 
p oint o f uni t y, is lost . As all t e wheels o a wa c cQr- ~~~~ 
r espon d t o e ff ect t he s rrme purpose, wh ich is that of measuring 
time , so ough t t he spr ings of governmen t to be regulated, that 
all the d i f f e r ent branches of admin i st r ation may equally con--
cur to the gr e atest good of the s t a t e; an important object, 
of which we ou gh t never to lose sigh t. 
We may add , t he per sonal i n t eres t of ministers and 
gener als u s u ally occasions them to cou nteract each other 
withou t ceasing , and sometimes to impede the execution of 
the best plans, because they had not been conceived by 
thems elves . Bu t "t.he =evil is a t i.ts u tmo.s..t , when per_verse 
mi nds a e o e r s u ade e so_ 
and the u h l · a ~ The monar ch then be-
comes the enemy his people , withou t knowing why; is 
sever e , r i gor ou s , and inhuman~ from mistake; for , the 
principle on which he acts being false, the consequences 
must necessari ly be the same . 
The sove r e i gn is attached by i ndissolu ble ties to the 
body of the s t a t e ; hence it follows t hat he, by repercus-
sion , is sensible o f a ll the ills which afflict his sub-
jects ; a nd t he peop le , in like manner, s u ffer from the 
misfortunes whi c h a ffect their sove r eign . There is but 
one gener al good , wh ich i s that of the stat e . If the 
monar ch lose h i s p r ov inces, he i s no longe r able as for-
mer ly t o assis t his subjects . If misfor t u ne have obliged 
him to contr act debts, they must be liqu idated by the 
poor c i tizens ; and, in r eturn, i f t he people are not nu-
merou s, and if t hey are oppr ess ed by pover ty, the sovereign 
is dest i t u t e o f all r esou r c e . These a r e t ru ths so incon-
testa ble that t he r e is no need to insist on them further. 
I once mor e r epeat, the sover e jgn r~pr2~nts tre state; 
he and hi s peop le form but one body, whi ch can only be ~ 
happy a s far as u n i ted by concor d . The p r ince is to the 
nation he gove r ns what the head is to the man; it is his 
du ty to see, think , and act fo r t he whole community, that 
.he may p rocu r e it ever y a dvantage of which it is capable. 
· · . t ended that a monar chical shou ld excel b-
se ~ence ~s pronou nce 
I 
I 
\ 
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He must be active, possess integrity, and collect his 
whole power s, that he may be able to run the career he 
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has commenced . Here follow my ideas concerning his duties. 
He ought to p r ocure exact and ci r cumstantial informa- , 
tion on t he str~ngth and weakness of his country, as well 
relative to pecuniary resources as to population, finance, 
trade, laws, and t he genius of the nation whom he is ap-
pointed to gover n . If the laws are good they will be 
clear in their definitions; otherwise, chicanery will seek 
t o elu de their spirit to its advantage, and a r bitrarily 
and i r regularly determine the fortunes of individuals. 
Lawsuits ought to be as short as possible, to prevent the 
ruin of the appellants, who consume in useless expences 
what is justly and duly their right . This branch of gov-
ernment c a nnot be t oo car efully watched, that every pos-
sible barrier may be opposed to the avidity of judges and 
c ou ns ellor s . Ever y person is kept within the limits of 
t hei r duty, by occasional visits i nto the p r ovinces . Who-
ever imag ines himself to be inj u red will venture to make 
his complaints to the commission ; and t hose who are found 
to be p r evaricators ought to be severely punished. It is 
perhaps superflu ous to add that the p~nalty ought never to 
exceed the crime; that violence neveF"ought to supersede 
l aw; and that it were better the sovereig n should be too 
merciful than too severe . ~'-~ ' ~
As every pers b does not proceed on principle is 
incon~istent in his conduct, it is still more necessary 
that the magistrate who watches over the public good 
should act f r om a deter minate system of politics, war, 
finance , commerce, and law . Thus, for example, ~..P~opl~ 
of mild rna not to h ch 
s a r e ada te ~ Gh~~e~ The basis of such 
sys ems ou ght always to be corr espondent to the greatest 
good society can receive . Their p r inciples ought to be 
conformable t o the situation of the country, to its 
ancient cu stoms, if they a r e good, and to the genius of 
the nation ., . . 
The mili t a r y system ou ght, in like manner, to rest 
on good principles, which from experience are known to be 
certain . The geniu s of the nation ought to be understood; 
of what it is capab le , and how far its safety may be 
risked by leading it against the enemy . The warlike cus-
toms of the Greeks and Romans a r e interdicted, in these 
a ges . The discover y of gu npower has entirely changed the 
mode of maki ng war . A s u per iori ty of fire at p r esent 
decides the day . Discipline, rules , and tactics have all 
been changed, in o r der that they may conform to this new 
custom; and the recent and enor mous abuse of numerous 
t r ains of a r tillery, which incumber a r mies, obliges others, 
in like manner, to adopt this method; as well to maintain 
themselves in their posts as to attack the foe in those 
whi c h they shall occupy, should reasons of importance so 
require .. . . 
Bu t neither politics nor the army can prosper if the 
finances are not kept in the greatest order~ and if the 
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prince himself be not a prudent economist. Money i~ like 
the wand of the necromancer, for by its aid miracles are 
performed. Grand political views, the maintenance of the 
military, and the best conceived plans for the ease of the 
people, will all remain in a lethargic state, if not ani-
mated by money. The economy of the sovereign is the more 
useful to the public good, because if he have not suffi-
cient funds in reserve, either to supply the expenses of 
war, without loading his people with extraordinary taxes, 
or to succour citizens in times of public calamity, all 
these burthens will fall on the subjects, who will be with-
out the resources, in such unhappy times, of which they 
will then stand in the most need . 
No government can exist without taxation, ...wh~w ,s, 
e ually necessaxx to the r~ ublic and to tne 'monarchy, 
The sovere1gn who labours in the public cause mus e 
paid by the public; the judge the same, that he may have 
no need to prevaricate . The soldier must be supported 
that he may commit no violence, for want of having whereon 
to subsist . In like manner, it is necessary that those 
persons who are employed in collecting the finances should 
receive such salaries as may not lay them under any temp-
tation to rob the public. These various expenses demand 
very considerable sums, and to these must still be added 
money that should only be laid apart to serve for extra-
ordinary exigences . This money must all be necessarily 
levied on the people; and the grand art consists in levy-
ing so as not to oppress . That taxes may be equally and 
not arbitrarily laid on, surveys and re gist ers shouta be 
made, by which, if the people are properly classed, the 
mone · · e income of the persons 
yayi D8-'. This is a thing so necessary that it woul e an 
unpardonable fault, in finance, if ill-imposed taxes should 
disgust the husbandman with his labours . Having performed 
his duties, it is afterward necessary he and his family 
should live in a certain degree of ease. Far from oppres-
sing the nursing fathers of the state, they ought to be 
encouraged in the cultivation of the lands; for in this 
cultivation the true riches of a country consists ... . 
In most of the kingdoms of Europe there are provinces 
in which the peasants are attached to the glebe, or are 
ser to their lor s. This, of all conditions, is the 
most unhappy, and that at which humanity most revolts. No 
man cer as born to be the slave of his equal. e 
reasonably detest such an abuse; an 1 i ~osed that 
nothing more than will is wanting to abolish so barbarous 
a custom . But this is not true; it is held on ancient 
tenures, and contracts made between the landholders and 
the colonists . Tillage is regulated according to the 
service performed by the peasantry; and whoever should 
suddenly desire to abolish this abominable administration 
would entirely overthrow the mode of managing estates, and 
must be obliged, in part, to indemnify the nobility for 
the losses which their rents must suffer. 
( 
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The state of manufactures and of n article no 
less impor ant, next presents itself . For the country to 
be preserved in prosperity, it is indubitably necessary 
that the balance of trade should b · · r. If it 
pay more for importation than it gains by exportation, 
the result will be that it will be annually impoverished. 
Let us suppose a purse in which there are a hundred ducats, 
from which let us daily take one, and put none in, and 
every body will allow that in a hundred days the purse 
will be empty . The means to avoid incurring any such loss 
are to work up all raw materials of which the country is 
in possession, and to manufacture foreign raw· materials, 
that the price of labour may be gained, in order to pro-
cure a forei g n market ... . 
We shall now speak of another article, which perhaps is 
equally interesting . There are few c_ountries in which the 
people are all of one religious opinion; they often total-
ly differ . There are some who are called sectaries. The 
question then is started -- Is it requisite that the peo-
ple should all think alike, or may each one be allowe.d to 
think as he pleases? Gloomy politicians will tell u~ 
every body ought to be of the same opinion, that there 
may be no division among the citizens . The riest · 1 
add whoeve d e not think like me · amned, and it is 
by no means_ gr..QPe ha.t y king should be the in of the 
_-The inevitable desiucti on is they must be de-
rna be the more prosper-
~:....f.JJ-~~ ~...,... (7:)_'1 ~ . 
To this it is answered that all the members of one so-
ciety never thought alike; that, among Christian nations, 
the majority are Anthropomorphites; that, among the Cath-
olics, most of the people are idolaters, for I shall never 
be persuaded that a clown is capable of distinguishing 
between Latria and Hyperdulia . He simply and really 
adores the image he invokes . Therefore there are a num-
ber of heretics in all Christian sects . What is more, 
each man believes that which appears to him to be truth. 
A poor wretch may be constrained to pronounce a certain 
form of prayer, although he inwardly refuse his consent. 
His persecutor consequently has gained nothing. But, if 
we revert to the origin of all society, it will be found 
evident that er · n has no ri interfere in 
the belief o · ct . Would it not be madness to 
imagine men who have said to another man, their equal, 
"We raise you to be our superio;r>, because we are in love 
with slavery; and we bestow on you the power of directing 
our thoughts, according to your will?" On the contrary, 
they have said, "We have need of you for the maintenance 
of those laws which we are willing to obey, and that we 
may be wisely governed and defended; but we also require 
that y ou should respect our freedom . " This is the sen-
tence pronounced, and it is without appeal. Nay, ~-
~ance is itself so advantageo~, to the people ong whom 
it i s established, that it constitutes e . ines ~ 
the state . As soon as there is that perfect freedom of 
<"* 
( 
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op1 n1on , t he people a r e a ll at peace ; whe r eas per secution 
has given birth to t he most bloody civil wars , and s u ch 
as have bee n the most inveter ate and the most dest ructive. 
The least evil that r esul t s from ~secuti on is to occa-
sion the per secu ted t o emigr ate . ~-~e popu lation of France 
has suffered i n cer tain pr ovinces , and those provinces 
still a r e sensible t o the r evocation of the edict of Nantes) 
Such are in gener al the du ties imposed u pon a prince, \ 
from which, in o r der that he may never depart, he ought 
of ten to recollect he h imself is but a man, like the least 
o f his subjects . If he be the first general, the first 
minis ter of t he realm, i t is not that he should r emain the 
shadow o f a u thority, but that he shou ld fulfill the duties 
of s u ch ti tles , He is only the fi r st ~ervant of the state, 
who is obliged t o act wi t h probity a nd p r udence; and to 
r emain as t o tally disinterested as if he were each mqment 
l i a ble to r ender an acc ount o f h is administ r ati ons to his 
fellow citiz e ns , 
Thus he is cul pabl e, if h e be pr odigal o f the money of 
the p e ople , disper sing the produ c e o f the taxes in luxury, 
pomp, o r licent i ousness , It is fo r him t o watch o ve r 
morals ~ whi c h a r e the gu ardians o f t he laws, and to im-
prove the national edu cation, and not perver t it by ill 
examples . One o f the most important objects is the preser-
vation of good mor als, in all thei r purity; to which the 
sovereign may greatly cont r ibute, by distinguishing and 
rewar din g those citizens who have performed virtuous ac-
tions, and testifying his c ontemp t for s u c h a s are so de-
p r aved as n ot t o blush at their own diso~ders . The prince 
ou gh t highly t o disappr ove o f every dishonest act, and 
refuse dis t inctions t o men who a r e incorrigible. 
Ther e is ano ther interesting object which ought not to 
b~ lost sight of, a nd Which, if neglected, would be of ir-
r epar able prej u dice to good -morality ; which is that 
pri nces a r e l iab l e too h ighly to notice per sons who are 
possessed o f no other mer it than that of great wealth. 
Honours, s o u ndeser vedly bestowed, confi r m the people in 
the vu lgar p r ej dice t hat weal th, only, is necessary to 
gain respect . Inter est and cupidity will then br eak forth 
from the cu r b by which they are restrained . Each will 
wish t o accumula e r iches; a nd , t o acqu i r e these, ~he most 
iniqu itou s means will be employed . Cor rupti on increases, 
takes root, and becomes general . · Men o f abi lities and 
vi r tue a r e despised, and the pu blic honour none but the 
bastards o f Mida s, who dazzle by thei r excessive dissipa-
tion and t hei r pomp . To p r event national manners from 
being perverted t o an exc ess so horr ible, the princ e 
ought ' t o be i ncessan tly attentive t o distinguish nothing 
but per sonal mer it , and to show his c ontempt f o r that 
opulence which is destitu te of morals and of vi rtue. 
As the s over eign is p r operly the head of a family of 
ci tizens, the fa t he r o f his people , he ough t on all occa-
sions to b e the last refuge of the unfor t u nate; to be the 
par ent o f the or phan, a n d the husband o f t he widow; t o 
have as much pity f o r t he lowes t wretch as f o r t'he greatest 
( 
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court ier ; and t o shed his benefactions over those who, 
deprived o f all o t her aid , can only find succour in his 
benevolence . 
- 41 
Such , according to t he p rinciples which we established 
at the beginning o f t his Essay, is the most a ccurate con-
ception we can for m of the duties of a sover eign, and the 
only manner which can r ender monarchical government good 
and advantageous . Should the condu ct of many princes be 
fou nd differ ent, i t mus t be at tributed to their having re-
flected bu t little on their insti t u tion, and its der iva-
tory du ties . They have borne a burthen with the weight 
and importance of which they · were u nac quainted, and have 
been mis led from the want of _knowledge; f or in our times 
ignor ance commits more fau lts t han vice " Su ch a sketch of 
sover eignty will perhaps appear t o t he censorious the 
archetype of the St oics ; and ideal sage, who never existed 
except in i magination, and to whom t he near est appr oach 
was Mar cu s Aureliu s . We wish this feeb le Essay wer e cap-
able of fo r ming men like Au r elius ; it would be the hi ghest 
r eward we c ou ld possibly e x p e c t, at the same time that it 
would condu ce t o t he good of · mankind . * 
The influence o f Jean Jacqu es ~ousse~u (1712-1778) on the 
men and ideas of the Enli ghtenmen t was du e not only to his ac-
cep tance and u se of t ypical En light enment ideas, but also t o 
his powe r f u l expression o f the feelings behind those ideas . He 
enquire whether, taking 
as t heY may be mad~ , - · 
·us t and Gertain r e 
* r e e r 1c reat , ' An Essay on Forms o Government, an on 
the Dut ies o f Sovereigns," in Political, Philosophical and Satyr-
ical Miscellanies (London, 1789) , V, 7-16, 18, 20-25, 2~2 . 
;?~~V4? ~~.11wvr ~~kf~-~~~ 
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of my resear ch I shall endeavour to unite what right per-
mits with what int e r est p r escr ibes, t hat justice and 
utility may no t be separated. 
I shall ent e r on my enqu iry wi thou t saying anything 
abou t the impor tance of my subject . I f I am asked whether 
I am a p r ince o r a lawgiver, that I wr ite on politics, I 
shall answer that I am neither , and for that reason I am 
a political writer . I f I wer e a p rince or a lawgiver, I 
should not was t e in theory the time which I ought to em-
ploy in p r ac t ice; I wou ld act or I would remain silent. 
Born a citizen of a free Sta~e , and, as such, a member 
of its Sovereign , however weak the influence of my voice 
may p r ove in the determination of public affairs, -the 
ri ght of voting on s u ch occasions imposes on me the duty 
of informing mysel f on the subject : and I am happy, when-
ever I medi t ate on gover nment s, to find that my researches 
always af f or d me new r eason to admi r e that of my own coun-
t r y . 
Chapter I 
Subject of the Fi r st Book r.t; ~ 1.#~ M~n is p or n free , and ye t we see him everywhe~ ~ ~~ 
in chai ns . Those who believe themselves the masters ~ ;-
01 others cease not to be even greater slaves than the 
people t hey govern. How this happens I am ignorant; 
but if I am asked what r enders it justifiable, I believe 
it may be in my power to r esolve the question . 
If I wer e only to consider for ce, and the effects of 
it, I should s ay_, "When a people is constra:i, Q..e.d, t~y, 
and does obey, it does wel l ; but as soon as it can throw 
o its yoke, and does throw it off , it does better : for _ 
a people may cer tainly use, for the recovery of their ~ ' ~ 
liberty, t he same right that was employed to deprive them ~~/ 
of it : it was ei t her justifiably r ecovered, or unjusti-
fiably tor n f rom them." But tlJ.e social order is a sacred 
right wh~ for the · al Yet t~ 
right comes ot f r om natur e; it i~therefore f9 unded o~ 
c ventions . The question is, what those conventions are. 
But , bef ore I come to that point, I must establish the 
p r inciples which I have just asser ted . 
Chapter I I I 
Of the Right of the Strongest 
The st r onges t are still never suf ficiently strong to 
ensure them continu al mastership, unless t hey find means 
of t r ansfor ming force into ri ght, and obedience into duty . 
Hence the r i~ht of tbe str ongest -- a ri ht which seems 
ironica in a earance, but is ?ally establis e as a 
p r inciple . But shal we never have an explanation of this 
't erm'? Fo:rce is a physical power; I do not see what moral-
ity can result f r om its effects . To yield to force is an 
act of necessity , not of inclinat ion; or it is at best 
only an act o f prudence . In what sense then can it be a 
duty? 
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Let us s u ppose for a moment the existence of this p~e­
tended r ight . I see n_g thipg that can arise frOl!Li:t but ~L L~~ a. 
inexpl jcahl e nonse::l:l5e . For , .!f we adrni t - that force con- rT- -
sf1 tutes right , the effect changes with the cause: _ ~ 
1orce wh1 c h ove co j__rst succeeds to its :t,i 
As soon as men can di sobey with impunity, they can do so 
justifiably; and because the str ongest is always in the 
righ t, strength is t he only thing men should seek to ac-
qu i r e , But what s ort of right i s t hat which perishes 
with the force that gave it existence? If it is neces-
sary t o obey by f orce, there can be no occasion to obey 
from duty; and whe n f or ce is n o more , al l obligation ceases 
with it , We see, therefor e, that this wor d "right" adds 
nothing to f orce, but is indeed an unmeaning term . 
If in saying, "Let us obey t he powerful," they mean to 
say, "Let us yield t o for ce , " the precept is good, but it 
is s u perflu ous, f o r it never is or can be violated . All 
power , we a r e told, c omes fr om God , I grant it does; bu t 
all disease s likewise c ome from the same hand, and yet 
who eve r forbade us t o cal l in a physician? If a robber 
surprises me in a corner of a wood , is it necessary that 
I shou ld not only give him my pur se when forced to do so, 
but am I in conscienc e obl iged to give it t o him, though 
I shou ld be i n a position to e scape? For the fact is, 
t he pistol which he holds i s also a power . 
tHte !!J t+Sa:a:£&; t~gg;~l~~~~ ~:a~n f~:aii~/t~s 1 :fti~~j~~-
,Powe~ . Thus everything goes back t o my first question . 
.. . To r enou nce our quality 
of man, aru o 
No adequate c ompensation can possibly be made for a sac-
rifice so complet e . Such a renunciati on is incompatible 
with t he pature of ma n; whose actions, when once he is 
depri ved of his free wi ll, must be destitu te of all moral-
ity . Finally, a convention which stipu lates absolute 
authority on one side, and unlimi t ed obedience on the 
other, must be consider ed a s vain and cont r adictory . Is 
it not clear that t here can be no obl igation to a person 
from whom everything may be justly r equired? And does 
not the single circumstance of t her e being no equivalence 
and no exchange also annu l t he act? For what r ight can 
my slave have against me, si n ce ever ything that he has 
belongs t o me, and, his right be i ng mine, this right of 
mine against myself is absolute nonsense? 
Gr o tius and o thers derive from war another origin for 
this pr etended right o f s lavery . The victor having, ac-
cor ding t o them , a r i ght t o kill the vanquished, the lat-
ter may purchase his life at the expense of his liberty; 
a convention which is so mu ch the more justifiable be-
cause it t e nds t o benefit both parties . 
But it is clear that this pretended r ight of killing 
the va~q~ished results not in any ~an~er from the state ~ 
~ ~~ ~~----L~.;~:.-/,(<7 -~e~ ~ . ~~ ~ 
~~P't~~~~/lf . 
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of war ; because, while men r emain in their p r imitive inde-
pendence, there is no intercourse between them s ufficiently 
settled t o cons titute e ither peace or war; and they are 
not naturally_enemies. I t is a concurr ence of things, and 
no t of men, t hat occasions war; and the state of ca -
no t rise out o f s imple personal conc.er.nq, but only ou.tv of 
real r e iitrons i l}Or can pr i y.at.~ between ' ma n anclman-
~ ~ . 
exist ei t her ~n t he state o f nat]1re, where there ~s 
settled_property L or i n a · a e, whe r e ever 
r. u nd he au th · aw.s . 
·Private c ombats , duels, and rencontres a r e acts w:Qicli 
do not consti tute a state of war ; and with regard to the 
petty wars authorized by the "Establishmen ts" of Louis IX 
of France, a nd suspended by t he ~eace of God, they were 
abuses o f the feudal gover nment, a system so completely 
absurd that it contradicted t he principles o f natural 
ri ght and of every sound polity . 
Uar is ther efore not a c onc ern between man and man 
but be t ween ~ te and State in Whi Ch individuals are onLy 
enemies ace ly , not as men, or as citiz s, but as 
·s...o ~ers ,; o t as members of a cou. ntr , but as_ its de f enders. 
In fine, States can only have o · e r States, and not men, 
for enemies, bec ause t her e c an be no true r elation between 
thi n gs of dif f erent natures ... . 
Of ~;;._ (£, 
~~~~~~~~~~~~r- ~~ ~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-~- ~~~~u~al ~~~ 
~s insuffi · come e r esis es  
, o h is £:eservatio» . Tis primit i ve state can therefore . ~ · 
s ubsist no longer ; and the human race would perish unless
it changed its manner o f life . h~C- k;t]f--
As men cannot create for themselves new forces, but _/ _ 1::-, ~ 
mer ely unite a nd direct those which a l r eady exist~e -v~P~ J 
only means t he¥ can empl oy f or thei r reservation is~~-
1form by aggr e ga ~on em aae of f o r ~e 
able t o overcome be put in motion as 
one body, and t o act 
This assemblage o f forces mus t be produ ced by the con-
currence of many; but as the f orce a nd t he liber ty of each 
man are the chi ef instruments o f his preservation, how can 
he engage t hem elsewhe re withou t danger t o himself, and 
without neg lecting t he care which is due himself? This 
difficulty, wh i ch leads di r ectly to my subject, may be ex-
p r essed in t hese words ~ 
"jihe.J;e sha J 1 w'it;=f ind § :(grm 
d al}d r o t ect w~th t h 
The a r ticles of this c ontrac t ..a.;ce_ so u nalterably _f ixed 
by the nature o f the a c t t hat the least modification renders 
------------
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them vain and of no effect; so that they are the s ame ~~ 
everywh~e, and are everywhere tac i t f y understood and adffiitte~ e ven though they ma never have been formal! 
announced; un 1 , e soc1al compac e1ng v1olated, each 
~nd1 v i dual is res t ored to his ori ginal ri ghts, and re-
sumes his native liberty, while losing the conventional 
l i berty for wh i ch he renounced it. 
The a rti cles o f the social contract will, w clearly 
understood , be found reducible to t .his oint: 1b.fL. 
total aliena t ion o f ea~ associ a~ ... an hi~ ri ht , 
to the whole . communi 't,Y~ ,4 fo · n t . · _ l....,P. lace 1 as every 
iffiliViatia l g ives h i mseLf.. l:lp entirely, the condition qf 
every person i s a · ~a; and being a~ · ~~
~he in~erest of ondition offensive 
0 0 ners. 
ay:-more than this, the alienat ion being made without 
any reserve, the union is as complete as it can be, and no 
associate has any furt her claim to anything: for if any 
individual ::r_etained ri ghts not .e.n.ioyed i n gen_eral by all, 
"as ' there would be no common superior t o decide between him 
and the public, each person being i n some points his own 
judge, would soon pretend to be so in everything ; and 
t hus would t he t cont_i nued and th.e a so-
ciation necessarily become tyrannical or be anni · ad. 
1nally , each ~erson 1v · · , and so not 
t o any one ind1v 1 ua ; an as there is no one associate 
over whom the same right is not acqui red whi ch is · ceded 1 
to him by others, each gains an equivalent for what he 
loses, and finds his force increased for preserving that 
which he possesses. 
I f , theref ore, we exclude from t he social compact all 
that is no t essential, we shall find it reduced to the ·~G~ - ~ 
following terms : "/ , / r--
Each of us places in common his person and all his~ 1~~~~ 
power--unGertne supremeairect1 on--oi the generalWI1I;and ~~~~ 
as one body we all receive each member as an 1ndiVISTble ~~~ 
part of--=tlie Wlio~ -- - C?te-~--..., 
-- From that moment, instead of as many separate persons~~ 
as ther e are contract ing parties, this act of association -- :zZ, 
p roduces a moral and collective body, composed of as man~ ~ 
members as there are votes in the assembly, which from ~~--/ · 
this act rece i ves its unity , its common self, its life, 
and its will. This public person, whi ch is thus formed 
by the union of all other persons, took f ormerly the name 
of "ci ty," and now takes that of "republic" or "body pol-
itic." It is called by its members "State" when it is 
passive, "Sovereig n" when in activity, and, whenever it 
is compared with other bodies of a similar kind, it is 
denominated "power." The associates t ake collectively 
t he name of "peop le," and separately, that of "citizens," 
as participat ing in t he sovereig n authority, and of "sub-
jects," because t hey are subjected to the laws of the 
St ate. But these terms are frequently confounded and 
used one for the other; and it is enoug h that a man under-
stands how to dis t inguish them when they are employed in 
( 
( 
all their precision . 
-Chapter VI I 
Of the Sovereign 
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It appears frO:ffi this formula that the act of associ-
ation contains a reciprocal en a ement between the 
~n .1 · ua ~ an a each individual, contracting, as 
it were, with himself, is engaged under a double charac-
ter; that is, as a member of the Soverei n en a in ith 
individuals, an as a member of th. t te d with the 
Sovereign . But we canno apply here the maxim of civil 
right, that no person is bound by any engagement which he 
makes with himself; for there is a material difference 
between an obligation to oneself individually , and an ob-
ligation to a collective body of which oneself constitutes 
a part. 
It is necessary to observe here that public delibera-
tion, which can bind all the subjects to the Sovereign, in 
consequence of the double character under which the mem-
bers of that body appear, cannot, for the opposite reason, 
bind the Sovereign to itself; and consequently that it is 
against the nature of the body politic for the sovereign 
power to impose on itself any law which it cannot break. 
Being able to consider itself as acting under one char-
acter only, it is in the situation of an individual form-
ing~ contract with himself; and we see therefore that 
there neither is nor ·can be any kind of fundamental law 
obligatory for the body of the people, not even the so-
cial contract itself . But this does not mean that this 
body could not very well engage itself to others in any 
manner which would not derogate from the contract; for, 
with respect to what is external to it, it becomes a 
simple being, an individual. But the body politic, or 
the Sovereign, which derives its existence from the sac-
redness of the contract, can never bing itsel! even 
towards outsider~, i~at would dero~ate : from 
li rf inal act, ~c alienating any ortion f 't-
sel_f, or submitting to another Soyere1gn. To violate the 
contract by which it exists would be to annihilate itself; 
and that which is nothing can produce nothing . 
As soon as this multitude is united in one body, you 
cannot offend one of its members without attacking the 
body; much less can you offend the body without incurring 
the resentment of all the members. Thus duty and inter-
est equally oblige the two contracting parties to lend 
aid to each other; and the same men must endeavour to 
unite under this double character all the advantages 
which attend it . 
Further, the Sovereign, being formed only 
dividuals who compose i ~ , ~ther has, _ n~o~r~c~~~~ 
interest contrary to th~:i,~; consequent ly, the sovereig;n 
power need give no guarantee to its subjects, because it 
is impossible that the body should seek to injure all its 
members; and we shall see presently that it can do no 
injury to any individ~al in particular. The Sovereign, 
lJ Q;ua_ ~~~ k.*· ll . ,P- ~ -- ~ u:-.5.: t2. ~ bl!k._,__,U;~d_ --~ : £ _ 
d.., · · •· + ' . · .-rl- Ctr( ~~a4fi a..-<7.4~-/" ~~7 ~ . A/~..-e-o/~_/ -+~  . 7 I / -/1~-~~~prv . 
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~ s alwa s ever thin it ou ht to_jQe. 
But this is not so with the relation of subjects 
towards the Sovereign, which, notwithstanding the common 
interest, has nothing to make them responsible for the 
performance of their eng agements if some means is not 
found of ensuring their fidelity. 
In fact, each indiv i dual may, as a man, have a pri-
vate will, dissimilar or contrary to the general will 
which he has as a citizen . His own private interest may 
dictate to him very differently from the common inter-
est; his absolute and naturally independent existence 
may make him reg ard what he owes to the common cause as 
a gratuitous contribution, the omission of which would be 
less injurious to others than the payment would be bur-
densome to himself; and considering the moral person 
which constitutes the State as a creature of the imagina-
tion, because it is not a man, he may wish to enjoy the 
r ights of a c itizen without being disposed to fulfil the 
du ties of a subject. Such an injustice wou ld in its 
progress cau se the ruin of the body politic . 
In order , therefore, to prevent the social compact 
from becoming an empty formula, it tacitly comprehends 
the engagement, which alone can give effect to the others 
-- that whoever refuses to obey the general will shall be 
compelled to it by the whole body : this in fact only 
forces him to be free; for this is the condition which, 
by giving each citizen to his country, guarantees his 
absolute personal independence, a condition which gives 
motion and effect to the political machine , This alone 
renders all civil engagements justifiable, and without it 
they would be absurd, tyrannical, and s u bject to the most 
enormous abu ses. 
Chapter VIII 
... O.f- -the.. Gi v-i .l - t-a .t 
from the state of nature 
( 
being and a man , 
In o r der to draw a balance between the advantages 
and disadvantag es at t ending his new situ ation, let u s 
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state them in s u ch a manner that t hey may be easily compared. 
~s by the social contr act his natur al liberty, and 
an unlimited right to all which tempts hlw, and which~ 
can obtain; in r eturn h e ac u ires civ·~ liberty, and pr~­
prietorship o . a 1 he possesses. T a t we may not be de-
""Ceived in the value of these compensations, we must dis-
tin guish natural liber ty, _w h j ch-k.GG-w.s · no b m mds 'But -tile 
power of · · ' f r om c · · · te.tlY-, · ch is 
limited he o- _,_e,r:a l wil~; and between J20Ssession, 
w 1c is only the effect of force o r of the rigb1 of the _ 
first occupant~ ~m pxnpert~ which must n_a 
.ROSitive title . In addition we mi ght add to the other · 
acqu isitions o f the cfvil state that of moral liberty, 
which alone rende r s a man master of himself; fo r it is 
slaver t o be u nder the impu lse of mer e appe t ite ~ 
r ee om o o . e y a aw wh1c we prescr1 e o r ourselves , 
Bu t I h ave already sai d t oo much on this head , and t h e 
philosophical sense of the word "liberty" is not at pres-
ent my s u bject , 
Chapter IX 
Of Real Property 
. , , I shall conclude this chapter 
whi c h mus t ser v e for the basis of t h::.e;:_~=-=:..:..-;;.,=--.::;;.:;.,...,;;;..t..,:;;...:..:;.;;,; 
it is hat instead of de the 
be ever so u nequal i n str ength o r in genius, 
equalized by c onv ent ion and legal right , 
Book II 
Chapte r I 
That Sovereign t~:;l:!;:n!PJ e 
The fi rs=t'""and ti't§= · consequence of the prin-
ciples already es tabl ished is t hat t he gener al will alone 
can di rect t he f o r ces o f the Stat e a greeably t o the end of 
its institu ti on, which is t he c ommo n g ood ; fo r if the 
cl a shing o f p r i v ate i nter e sts has r ender ed the establish-
ing of societies necessar y, t he a greement of the same in-
t e r es t s has made such establishments p ossible . It is what 
i s common in t h e ee differ ent interes t s that forms the 
social bond; a nd if there was not some point in which they 
all u nanimou sly c entered, no society could exist . It is 
on the basis of this common i nter es t alone that society 
must be g o verned , 
I say, therefor e , t ha t sovereigntr, being only the ex-
e r cise o f the gener al will' ca~ never ali~nat_e i tsel;f' J!lld, 
that the Soverei~ ~~ ~~ ~¥ a collecti y e he jpg , caq 
n a t b e reEresent~ ifsRii ~ the power may well be fta mfiL~d but __Q_t._~i __ . 
Indeed, if it is not imposs i ble that a private will 
( 
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should accord on some point with the general will, it is 
at least impossible that such agreement shou ld be regular 
and lasting; for the private will is inclined b it 
nature to partiality, an e general will to impartiality. 
rt is even more impossible to guarantee the cont i nuance~of 
this agreement, even if we were to see it always exist; 
because that existence must be ow.ing not to art but to 
chance . The Sovereign may indeed say ~ "My will at pres-
ent actually agrees with the will of s u ch and such a man, 
or at least with what he declares to be his will''; but it 
cannot say, "Our wills shall likewise agree tomorrow"; 
since it · would be absurd for the wi ll to bind itself for 
the future, and since it does not belong to any will to 
consent to what migh t be injurious to the being from whom 
the will proceeds . If, therefore, the people promise un-
conditionally to obey, the act of making s u ch a promise 
dissolves their existence, and they lose their quality of 
a people; for a..t the moment that ther e is a master. thepe 
< i~1 ~~;!::::;.:ot=::~;i gn, and frOJ)l · t ha :t_ momen t . the body ~ I do not say that the commands of chiefs cannot pass 
for gener al wills, so long as the Sover eign, being f r ee 
to oppose . them, does not do so . In such cases we mu~t 
presume from their silence that the people yield their 
consent . But I shall explain this more at large presently. 
Chapter II 
That Sovereignty is Indivisible 
For t he same reason that sovereignty is inalienable_, 
it is~divisible . For the enera or it 
J.. is ei t fier the will of t w "' _e bo -oi th 
at most £ut a deck@~. 
- But our political thinkers not being abl 
sovere1gnt in r1nc1 e ave div1 e 1t in its ob·ect : 
in ""'o force and will; leg islat1ve power and execut1 ve power; 
the r ights of levying taxes, of administer ing justice, 
and making war ; the internal government and t he power of 
treating with foreigners . But by sometimes confounding 
all these parts, and sometimes separating them, they make 
of the sovereign power a fantastical being composed of 
related pieces; as if man were composed of several bodies, 
one with eyes, another with arms, another with feet, but 
none with anything more . The mountebanks of Japan are 
said to dismember an infant in the sight of the spectators, 
throw its limbs one after another into the air, and make 
the child come down alive and whole. The tricks of our 
political jugglers are very similar, for after dismember-
ing the social body by a sleight wor thy of the black 
art, they bring its parts together again, nobody knows 
how . 
This error a r ises from our not having formed exact ideas 
of the sovereign authority, and from our taking for parts 
( 
X p. 60 
of that authority what are only its emanations. For ex-
ample, the acts of declaring war and making peace are 
considered as acts of sovereignty, when in fact they are 
not so, because neither of these acts is a law, but only 
the application of the law, a particular act which deter-
mines the application of the law, as we shall clearly 
perceive when the idea at.tached to the word "law" is fixed. 
By tracing in the ~arne manner the other divisions, we 
should find that whenever we suppose sovereign.±y divjded 
we deceive oursel~es; that the rights which we take for a 
part of~fiat sovereignty are all subordinate to it, and 
always suppose supreme wills of which they only sanction 
the execution . 
It is impossible to express how greatly this want of 
exactness has obscured the arguments and conclusions of 
writers on political right, when they have attempted to 
decide on the respective rights of kings and peoples by 
the principles which they have themselves laid down. 
Every person may see in the third and fourth chapters of 
the First Book of Grotius, how that learned man and his 
translator, Barbeyrac, have entangled and embarrassed 
themselves in their sophisms, fearful of saying too much, 
or of not saying enough to a.tl&wer- their designs, and ap- -
prehensive of clashing with those inter~ which they 
had to conciliate . 
Grotius, discontented with his own country, took 
refuge in France; and endeavouring to make his court to 
Louis XIII, to whom his book is dedicated, he has spared no 
pains to despoil the people of all their rights and trans-
fer them to their kings in the most artful manner. This 
was also the design of Barbeyrac, who dedicated his trans-
lation to George I, King of England . But unfortunately 
the expulsion of James II, which he calls "abdication," 
obliged him to proceed very cautiously, to shuffle and 
evade, that he mi ght avoid making King William appear a 
usurper. If these two writers had adopted the true prin-
ciples, all their difficulties would have been removed, 
and they would have been always consistent; but the task 
of speaking truth, and recommending themselves to no 
favour but that of the people, would have been to them a 
vexatious one. Truth does not lead to fortune, and the 
people have neither ambassadorships, professorships, nor 
pensions to bestow. 
X 
There is frequently much difference between the will of 
all and the general wil!_. The l~tter regards only the --
~mmon Sl; the for er regards private interest, and 
1s indeed but as · of private wi s ~ but remove om 
these same wills the pluses and minuses that cancel each 
other, and then the general will r emains as the sum of 
the differences. 
If, when the people, s u fficiently informed, deliberated, 
there was to be no communication among them, f r om the 
grand total of t r ifling differences the general will would 
always result, and their resolutions be always good . But 
when cabals and partial associations are formed at the ex-
pense of the gr eat association, the will of each such 
association, though general with r egard to its members, 
is private with regard to the State ~ it can then be said 
no longer that there a r e as many voter s as men, but only 
as many as there are associations . By this means the dif-
fere'nces be i n g less numer ous, the y produ ce a resu lt less 
general . Finally, when one of these associations becomes 
so lar ge that it p r evails over all the r est, you have no 
longer the sum of many opinions dissenting in a small de-
gree f r om each other , but one great dictating dissentient; 
from that moment there is no longer a general will, and 
the pr edominating opinion is only an individual one. 
~refore of the utmost importance for obtaining 
the expression of the general will, that r~ socf.: 
~e~y srru r - e State, and that every citizen 
s ould speak his opinion entirely from himself ~ such was 
the u nique and s u blime ~ystem of the great Lycurgus . 
When there are partial societies, it is politic to multi-
ply their number, that they may be all kept on an equality. 
This method was pursued by Solon, Numa, and Servius . 
These are the only precautions that can be taken to make 
the gener al will always intelligent, and prevent the people 
from being deceived . * 
* Jean Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract, ed . Charles 
Frankel (The Hafner Library-of Classics ) (New York ~ Hafner Pub-
lishing CO:: 1947 ) , pp . 5-6,-g~g, 10-ll, 14-19, 22-27 . Used 
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0 
ered i n 
general 
sider ed a s a 
Upon the Social Nature o f Man 
For as we have many membe r s in one body , and all mem-
ber snave not t1leSame o f fice: s o weoeingmany are 
one body in ChrTSt --;-aiid ever y one member s one of an-
other , -- Rom . xii. ~5 . 
, ,, I t c anno t indeed possibly be deni ed , t ha t our being 
God's c r eatures , and vi r t u e being t he natural law we a r e 
bor n u nder, and the whole constitu tion of man being 
plainly adapted t o it, a r e p r ior obligat ions to pie ty and 
v i rtue, t han t he consider ation t ha t God s e n t h i s Son into 
the wor ld t o s ave i t, and t he motives whic h arise f r om 
t he pecu l iar r elat ion of Chr istia ns, as members one of 
another u nder Chr ist our head. However , t hou gh all this 
be allowed, as it expr essly is by the inspi r ed wri ters ; 
yet it is manifest that Chr istians a t the t i me of the 
r evelation , and immediately after , cou ld not but insist 
mostly u pon consider ations of this latter kind , 
These obser vations show the or i g inal par ticu lar refer-
ence of t he t ext ; and the peculiar for c e with which the 
thing i n t ended by the allusion in it, must have been felt 
by the primitive Christian world. They likewise afford a 
r eason fo r treating it at this time in a more general way . 
The r elati on which the sever al par ts or members of the 
natural body have t o each other and to the whole body, is 
here compar ed t o the r elation which each par ticu lar person 
in society has to the other par ticu l ar per sons and to the 
whole soci e t y; a nd t he latter is intended to be illustr ated 
by the fo r me r , And if there be a likeness between t hese 
two r elations , the consequence i s obv iou s : that t he lat ter 
shows u s we wer e inte ed to . ~hers, a s t he 
fo r mer shows u s that the ·seve r al member s ofthe natural 
body wer e int ended t o be instruments of good to e a ch other 
and t o the whole body . But as t her e is scar ce any grou nd 
fo r a compar ison between society and t he mer e material 
body , th i s withou t the mind being a dea d inact i ve thing ; 
mu ch less can t he compar ison be carried to any length . And 
since the apostle speaks of the sever al me mber s as having 
distinct of f ices, which implies t he mind ; it canno t be 
though t an u nallowable liberty , ins tead of the body and its 
member s , t o s u bs t itute the whole n a ture of man,-anG all toe 
var 1ety of i nter nal principles which belong to it , Ana---
then tlie-comp a r 1son will be between the nature 0I ma n as 
~~ ecting self __ d t~din to rivate gp d his ow~ r es-
~r_vatlon ~~~..an~e . .u e of ma s havi 
~pect to socjet y, and tending to p r omo t e pu blic goo~ 
j.lle happ iness o f t ha :t saci e:ty_..,... These ends do indeed 
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perfectly coincide; and to aim at public a~d private good 
are so far fr om being i nconsistent , that they mutually 
p r omote each other ; yet in the following d i scourse t hey 
must be consider ed as entirely distinct; otherwise the 
nature of man as tending to one, o r as tending to the 
other, cannot be compared . There can no comparison be 
made, withe t considering the things compar ed as distinct 
and different . 
From this r eview and comparison of the nature of man 
as r especting self, and as respecting society, it will 
plainly appear, t hat there are as real and the same kind 
of indications i~uman nature ,that we were madeio_r __ 
society and to do good to our feTIOW creatUres; as~at 
we were Tlltenctedlto take-car e of our own life andlhealth 
and----.r>rivate good :-and that the-same ObJeetTOnSlie a gainst 
one of these-aBSertTOns~ agai~the o ther. For , 
-- -pir , , There is a natUr al principle of benevolence in 
man; which iS i n some degree t o s OCieLy--;-what self-love __ _ 
:1s to" the individual . And :1-rt"ii'er e be i n mank:1n an:y-
tiispos ition t o friendship; if t here be any s u ch t hing as 
compassion, for compassion is momentar y love; if there be 
any such t h ing as the paternal o r filial affectio ns ; if 
there be any affection in human nature, t he obj ect and 
end of which is the good of another; this is i tself benev-
olence, o r the love of another . Be it ever so shor t, be 
it in ever so low a degree, or ever so u nhappily confined; 
it pr oves the assertion, and points out what we wer e de-
signed fo r , as r eally as though it were in a higher degree 
and mor e extensive , I must however remind you that though 
benevolence and self-love are different; t hough the former · 
tends most d irectly to public good, and the latter to pri-
vate ~ yet they a r e so perfectly coincident, that the 
greatest satisfactions to ourselves depend upon our having 
benevolence in a due degree; and that self-love is one 
chief secu r ity o f our right behaviour towar ds society . It 
may be added, that their mutual coinciding, so that we can 
scar ce promote one without the other, is equally a p r oof 
that we were made for both . 
Secondly, This will further appear , from observing that 
the several pa~Ql~nd~d affections, hich ar disti~ct 
both r om - ~- e-and self-love do i _ ne~al ~OA-
rJ.bute and lead us to ublic ood as really as to private. 
It ~ight be thought too minute and par i cular, an · Wou 
carry u s too great a length, to distinguish between and 
compare together the several passions or appetites distinct 
from benevolence, whose primary use and intention is the 
security and good of society; and the passions dis tinct 
from self-love, whose primary intent i on and design is the 
security and good of the individual . It is enough to the 
present argument, that desi r e of esteem from other s, con-
tempt and esteem of them, love of society as distinct from 
affection to the good of it, indignat ion against success-
ful vice, that thes~ are public af f ections or passions; 
have an immediate respect to other s, naturally lead u s to 
regulate our behaviour in such a manner as will be of 
( 
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service to our fellow creatures. If any o r all of these 
may be considered likewise as p r ivate affections, as tend-
ing to p r ivate good; this does not hinder them from being 
public affections too, or destroy the good influence of 
them upon society, and their tendency to public g ood. It 
may be added, that as persons without any conviction from 
reason of the desirableness of life, wou ld yet of course 
p reserve it merely f r om the appetite of hunger; so by act-
ing merely from regard (suppose ) to repu tation, without 
any consideration of the good of other s, men often con-
tribute to public g ood . In both these instances they are 
plainly instru ments in the hands o f ano t her, in the hands 
of Providence, to carr y on ends, t he p r eserv ation of the 
individual and g ood of society, whi ch they themselves 
have not in their v iew or intention . The sum is, men 
l • ha s assions , and par t1cu lar a e -
ti both from se a rom benev-
all of the se have a tendency o r omo e b~ ub-
-=-=~~~~<~.-.~-~.::...:~-t::t."£2_ , ~nd __ mi£.:_~~-£9nS1~d- as~.l?J~s ting 
~~~:::_:::.:...-::==-..;:::o:.:::u~r;..:;s:::.;e=...v,.,.......,~eg_.ual].,y; an _ in ~_g¢fumon : but some of 
them _§_£,.Sill! most ~.mm~tely to r_esp~&Ji g"ther s, tQl r ena to 
public g ood ; others of them most immediately to r espect 
self, o r tend to p rivate good : as the forme r - are no~ 
' bene volence, so the latter are not self-love : neither 
sort .,.a..J:.e i l!§,.,.i. .ces of our lo ei..ther-~~s.abt.es 
oth e S.::; u L g.!!l., ins lrul..ce.s qj_ gux:. Mak~r' s care and love both 
of the · d:LY.i.dua± n d.. the S.P,e <j.. es J_ an. p_.x:.o..Q f:~~ - a e 1n-
tended .~ ~~ld ~E§~um~ntp_p{. ~ood to e ch t~~--' as 
·well as that ~we_ srHo:uld .he so to oursel . 
- -··Thirdly, · ---N""··. rinci le . ;£ reflectio ~ 
which they dis tin ui a ~rove and disa r ove 
1r own ac!j-~s. We are pla1n y cons 1~tu'tedsuc1r sort 
Uf c r eatu res as to reflect upon our own natu re. The mind 
can take a view of what passes within itself, its propen-
sions, aver sions, passions, affections, as respecting such 
objects , and in such degrees; and of the several actions 
consequent ther eupon . In this sur vey it appr oves of one , 
disapproves of another, and towar ds a third is affected in 
neither of these ways, but quite indifferent . This 
b di a roves hi 
io for this is t he 
word, though some t imes it is used so 
as to take in mor e . And that thi s facu lty tends to re-
str ain men f r om doing mischief to each other, and leads 
them to do g ood , is too manifest to need being insisted 
upon . Thus a parent has the affection of love to his 
childr en : t his leads him to take care of , to educate, to 
make due prov i sion for them; the nat u r al affection leads 
to t his : but the reflection that it i s his p r oper busi-
ness , what belong s t o him, that it is right and commend-
able so to do; this added to the affection becomes a much 
more set t led principle, and carries him on throu gh more 
labour and difficulties for the sake of his children, 
than he wou ld underg o from that affection alone, if he 
t hought it , and the course of action it led to, either 
( 
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indifferent or criminal. This indeed is impossible, to 
do that which is good and not to approve of it; for which 
reason they are frequently not considered as distinct, 
though they really are: for men often approve of the ac-
tions of others, which they will not imitate, and like-
wise do that which they approve not. It cannot possibly 
be denied, that there is this principle of reflection or 
conscience in human nature. Suppose a man to relieve an 
innocent person in great distress ; suppose the same man 
afterwards, in the fury of anger, to do the greatest mis-
chief to a person who had given no just cause of offence; 
to aggravate the injury, add the circumstances of former 
friendship, and obligation from the injured person; let 
the man who is supposed to have done these two different 
actions, coolly reflect upon them afterwards, without 
regard to their consequences to himself : to assert that 
any common man would be affected in the same way towards 
these different actions, that he would make no distinc-
tion between them, but approve or disapprove them equally, 
is too glaring a falsity to need being confuted. There 
is therefore this principle of reflection or conscience 
in mankind. It is needless to compare the respect it has 
to private good, with the respect it has to public; since 
it plainly tends as much to the latter as to the former, 
and is commonly thought to tend chiefly to the latter. 
This faculty is now mentioned merely as another part in 
the inward frame of man, pointing out to us in some de-
gree what we are intended for, and as what will naturally 
and of course have some influence. The particular place 
assi gned to it by nature, what authority it has, and how 
great influence it ought have, shall be hereafter con-
sidered. 
From this comparison of benevolence and self-love, of 
our public and private affections, of the courses of life 
they lead to, and of the principle of reflection or con-
s 'ence as respecting each of them, it is as manifest, ) 
at we were made for society, and to promote the haEPi-
ss o f it ; as that we were intended to take care of our 
n li f e, an~health, and private good. ~ 
And f rom th1s wh o l e rev1ew must be g iven a different 
draught of human nature from what we are often presented 
with . Mankind are by nature so closely united, there is 
such a correspondence between the inward sensations of 
one man and those of another, that dis grace is as much 
avoided as bodily pain, and to be the object of esteem 
and love as much desired as any external goods: and in 
many particular cases, persons are carried on to do good 
to others, as the end their affection tends to and rests 
in; and manifest that they find real satisfaction and 
enjoyment in this course of behaviour . There is such a < 
natural principle of attraction in man towards man, that 
having trod the same tract of land, having breathed in 
the same climate, barely having been in the same artifi-
cial district or division, becomes the occasion of con-
tracting acquaintances and familiarities many years after: 
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for any thing may serve the pur pose . Thus relations merely 
nominal are sought and invented, not by governors, but by 
the lowest of the people; which are found s u fficient to 
hold mankind together in little fraternities and copartner-
ships ~ weak ties indeed, and what may afford fund enough 
for ridicule, if t hey are absurdly considered as the real 
principles of that union : but they are in truth merely the 
occasions, as any thing may be of any thing, upon which 
our natur e carries us on according to its own previous 
bent and bias; which occasions therefore would be nothing 
at all, were . there not this prior disposition and bias of 
nature. Men a r e so much one body, that in a pecu liar man-
ner they feel for each other, shame, sudden danger, reT 
sentment, honour, prosperity, distres s; one o r another, or 
all of these, from the social nature in general, from be-
nevolence, upon t he occasion of natural r elation, acquaint-
ance, p r otection, dependence; each of these being distinct 
cements of socie ty. And therefore to have no restraint 
from, no r egard to others in our behaviour, is the specu-
lative a bsurdity of considering ourselves as single and 
independent, as having nothing in our nature which has 
respect to our fellow creatures, reduced to action and 
practice . And this is the same absurdity, as to suppose 
a hand, or any part, to have no natur al respect to any 
other, or to the whole body. 
But allowing all this, it may be asked, "Has not man 
dispositions and principles within, which lead him to do 
evil to other s, as well as to do good? Whence come the 
many miseries else, which men are the author s and instru-
ments of to each other?" These questions, so far as they 
relate to the fore going discourse, may be answered by ask-
ing, Has not man also dispositions and p r inciples within, 
which lead him to do evil to himself as well as g ood? 
Whence come the many miseries else, sickness, pain, and 
death, whi c h men are instruments and authors of to them-
selves? 
It may be thought more easy to answer one of these 
questions than the other, but the answer to both is 
really the same; that~m~a~n~k~i~n~d~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~-
which th wi at 
but thai as there is no s u ch thing as se 
so neither is there any such thing as ill-will in 
one man towards another, emulation and r esentment being 
away; whereas there is plainly benevolence or good-will: 
there is no such thing as love of injustice, oppression, 
t r eachery, ingratitude; but only eager desires after such 
and such external g oods; which, according to a very an-
cient observation, the most abandoned wou ld choose to 
obtain by innocent means, if they were as easy, and as 
effectual to their end : that even emulation and resent-
ment, by any one who will consider what these passions 
really are in nature, will be found nothing to the pur-
pose of this objection : and that the principles and pas-
sions in the mind of man, which are distinct both from 
( 
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self-love and benevolence , p r imar ily and most di r e ctly 
lead t o r i ght behavi our with regard to o thers as well as 
himself , and only secondar ily and accidentally to what is 
evil . Thus, though men, to avoid t he shame of one vil-
lany, a re somet imes gui l ty of a greater, yet it is easy 
to see, t ha t the original tendency of shame is to prevent 
the doing of shamefu l actions ; and its leading men to 
conceal s uch actions when done, is only in c onsequ ence of 
thei r being done; i . e . of the passions ' s not having an-
swered its fi.rst end-:-
If it be said, that t her e a r e per sons in the world, 
who are in great measure without the natur al affections 
t owards their fell ow creatures ~ there are likewise in-
stances of persons without the common natural affections 
to themselves ~ but t he natur e of man is not to be judged 
of by either o f these , but by what appears in the common 
world , in the bulk o f mankind . ... 
The sum of the whole is plai nly t his . The nature of 
~considered i n his singl e capacity, a nd with respect 
OOl y t o the present wor ld , is_ a dap t ed . · ~to 
attain the - i the 
wor l d , The nature g f man, considered in his pub-l~i~c~o~r~s~o~c~i~aT~ c apa ci t y, leads him t o a right behaviour 
in society to t hat course v1 
.e o ow or obey their nature in both these capacities 
and r espects t o a certain degm.e_, but note t i~l · ~ their 
actions do not come u p to the whole of what t heir nature 
leads them t o i n either o f these capacities or respects ~ 
and they often v · . e · nature i n both, i . e . as they 
neglect the duties they owe to e1r fe liow creatures, to 
which their nature l eads them ; a nd are i njuri ou s, to 
which their nature is abhorrent; so ther e is a manifest 
negl igence i n men of t he i r real happiness or interest in 
t he present wor l d, when that interest is inconsistent with 
a p r esent grati f i cat i on; for the sake of whi c h t hey neg-
ligently, nay , even knowingly, are t he author s and instru-
ments of t heir own misery a nd r uin . Thu s they are as 
often u nj ust to themse lves as t o other s , and for the most 
part a re equ ally so t o both by the same actions . * 
